Medicare’s Bundling Pilot:
Including Post-Acute Care Services

LAURA A. DUMMIT, Principal Policy Analyst
OVERVIEW — Fee-for-service Medicare, in which a separate

payment is made for each service, rewards health care providers
for delivering more services, but not necessarily coordinating
those services over time or across settings. To help address these
concerns, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 requires Medicare to experiment with making a bundled
payment for a hospitalization plus post-acute care, that is, the
recuperative or rehabilitative care following a hospital discharge. This bundled payment approach is intended to promote
more efficient care across the acute/post-acute episode because
the entity that receives the payment has financial incentives to
keep episode costs below the payment. Although the entity is
expected to control costs through improved care coordination
and efficiency, it could stint on care or avoid expensive patients
instead. This issue brief focuses on the unique challenges posed
by the inclusion of post-acute care services in a payment bundle
and special considerations in implementing and evaluating the
episode payment approach.
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he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(PPACA)1 includes a Medicare pilot program to test
whether bundling the payments for a hospitalization and
subsequent post-acute care (PAC) can “improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.” The
law outlines general parameters of the pilot: for beneficiaries
with designated conditions, Medicare would pay an entity
for covered services, including inpatient hospital, physician,
outpatient therapy, and post-acute care services delivered
during an episode of care that is initiated with a hospitalization and continues for 30 days after discharge (Figure 1). The
pilot, slated to start by 2013, will be evaluated on whether it
improved quality of care, health outcomes, and access, and
whether it reduced spending.2 The stakes are high for this
pilot, because if it is successful it could be expanded in the
Medicare program without any additional legislative action.
A bundled payment approach aims to improve care coordination
and to control the cost of an episode of care by changing providers’ financial incentives. Under fee-for-service payments, providers

FIGURE 1: National Medicare Bundling Pilot
Episode of Care
Three days prior to hospitalization
for an applicable condition
Applicable condition is one
or more of ten conditions
selected by the Secretary
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Source: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), §3023, National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, pp. 302–307.
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are rewarded for delivering more services, without regard for the
need for those services, and no entity is responsible for ensuring the
efficient delivery of services across providers. By making a single
payment to one entity, bundling makes that entity responsible for all
services required for the entire episode. The entity would arrange
for the array of acute and post-acute care services to be available and
would apportion the bundled payment to providers, including physicians, hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and home health agencies, involved in the patient’s care.
The primary financial incentive under bundling is to reduce the
costs of care provided during the episode because the entity receiving the payment would keep any difference between the payment
and episode costs; conversely, it would be responsible for any costs
above the payment amount. The entity could reduce costs by eliminating unnecessary services delivered during the episode, avoiding hospital readmissions, coordinating services across all providers and facilities to avoid duplication and waste, and delivering
the most efficient mix of services for the patient. Alternatively, the
entity could reduce costs by stinting on care or avoiding high cost
patients. The design of the pilot and the safeguards and oversight
incorporated into the program will determine whether the intent of
bundling is achieved.
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BACKG ROU N D
The Secretary of Health and Human Services will specify the requirements of the bundling pilot, including designating the medical
conditions that could be subject to the bundled payment (Figure 2,
see next page). Entities that want to participate in the pilot by receiving the bundled payment in return for delivering the bundled
services will propose the details of their particular approach. It is
anticipated that health care or hospital systems will apply to participate in the pilot as entities that receive the bundled payment. Although the law included general descriptions of the services covered
under the bundle and the time frame that defines the episode, many
factors could differ across pilot projects. The criteria for choosing
which entities will participate and the methods for evaluating the
pilot remain to be specified. It is not yet known how directive the
Secretary will be and how much flexibility entities will have in developing their approaches.

The National Health Policy Forum is a
nonpartisan research and public policy
organization at The George Washington
University. All of its publications since 1998
are available online at www.nhpf.org.
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FIGURE 2: National Medicare Bundling Pilot
Definition
of an Episode
(Bundle)

• Three days prior to a hospitalization for an applicable condition, the hospitalization,
through 30 days post-hospital discharge
• Applicable condition is one or more of 10 conditions selected by the Secretary
• Inpatient hospital services, physician services, outpatient hospital services, home health
care, skilled nursing care, inpatient rehabilitation facility services, long-term care
hospital services

Payment

• Comprehensive payment for all applicable services
• Made to the entity participating in the pilot program
• The Secretary shall develop payment methods, which may include bundled payments or
bids from pilot participants

Accountability

• Quality measures established by the Secretary to include: functional status, avoidable
hospital readmissions, community discharge, emergency room use, provider-acquired
infections, efficiency, patient-centeredness, patient perception of care, other measures including outcomes as appropriate
• Quality measures for episodes of care and for post-acute care
• Requirements that the entities participating in the pilot ensure an adequate choice of
providers and suppliers

Source: PPACA §3023, National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, pp. 302–307.

P OS T- ACU T E C A RE
Post-acute care includes the recuperation, rehabilitation, and nursing services following a hospitalization that are provided in skilled
nursing facilities (SNFs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs),
and long-term care hospitals (LTCHs), and by home health agencies
(HHAs) and outpatient rehabilitation providers (see text box, next
page). Medicare payments have increased rapidly to these providers. The most recent data indicates that spending on post-acute care
increased an average of 9 percent per year from 2000 to 2007 and
slowed to almost 6 percent per year in 2008 and 2009, which is still
considerably higher than the growth in overall health care costs.3
C ha ra c te ri s ti c s of P rov i d e r s

There is considerable overlap in the types of services provided in
the various PAC sites.4 In general, LTCHs are the most expensive setting and provide care to the most clinically complex patients. IRFs
4
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Medicare Post-Acute Care Providers: Number, Growth, and Payments
Long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) are certified as hospitals, meeting the same minimum staffing requirements,

range of services, and life-safety standards. In addition, LTCHs are required to have an average Medicare
length of stay of more than 25 days, which is intended to ensure that their patients are medically complex.
LTCHs that are located within an acute care hospital—the fastest growing segment of these providers—are
subject to additional requirements that limit the share of their patients admitted from the host hospital. The
number of LTCHs rose from 278 in 2001 to 432 in 2009, although they are still not available in most areas
of the country. In areas with no LTCH, acute care hospitals and SNFs substitute. The number of Medicare
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries treated in LTCHs continues to increase, as have average per-case payments, reaching over $35,000 per stay. Of all post-acute care providers, LTCHs treat the fewest number of
Medicare beneficiaries (37.7 per 10,000 FFS beneficiaries in 2008), however, their rapid growth and high cost
have raised concerns about their impact on Medicare spending.
Inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) must meet all acute care hospital conditions of participation plus ad-

ditional criteria related to the ability to provide intensive rehabilitation. The number of patients treated in
IRFs grew rapidly between 2002 and 2004 to reach 124.9 FFS beneficiaries per 10,000 after implementation
of a prospective, per-case payment method. Medicare patients then fell steadily to 95.6 per 10,000 by 2008,
which was expected as a result of enforcement of the 60 percent rule. This rule, or compliance threshold,
requires 60 percent of cases at a Medicare-certified IRF to be in 1 of 13 diagnoses specified by Medicare.
Patients with these diagnoses typically require the level of rehabilitation provided at IRFs. The average
Medicare payment per case reached $16,649 in 2008.
Skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) are the most numerous post-acute care provider, with 15,000 facilities in 2009.

The majority of SNFs also are licensed as nursing homes to provide long-term support services, which
are not covered by Medicare. SNFs have been providing a higher intensity of rehabilitation services to
Medicare patients in recent years. Although this might reflect changes in patient need, many believe it is
a consequence of Medicare payment policy changes that reward the provision of more therapy services
to patients needing rehabilitation. Medicare admissions per 10,000 FFS beneficiaries were 740 in 2008, up
from 670 per 10,000 in 2004.
Home health agencies (HHAs) provide the least intensive services and are often used after a patient has

been treated in another post-acute care site. Further, approximately half of Medicare patients in HHAs
are admitted from the community; that is, they have not had a prior hospital stay that triggered their need
for home health services. The number of HHAs has grown rapidly, from 7,061 in 2001 to 10,422 in 2009.
Beginning in 2000, home health visits were bundled for a single payment for a 60-day episode of care. This
payment change was implemented in response to rapid increases in the number of home health visits and
Medicare spending. The growth in home health spending slowed temporarily as a result of Medicare payment changes, but by 2009 it had increased to previous levels, topping 18 percent growth from 2008. At
the same time, the number of visits provided to each home health patient dropped by almost one half. In
2008, 9.1 percent of Medicare beneficiaries used home health care, with 37 visits per user and an average
payment of $2,786 per episode.
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program,
June 2010, available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun10DataBookEntireReport.pdf.
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generally treat patients who need more rehabilitation than patients
who are admitted to a SNF, and the IRF patients must be healthy
enough to participate in intensive therapy. In aggregate, SNFs provide fewer hours of therapy than IRFs and have a less skilled staffing
configuration, with less physician involvement and lower nurse-topatient ratios.5 HHAs provide rehabilitation or skilled nursing care
in the homes of patients who are unable to leave without assistance.
Over half of home health episodes are not initiated after a hospital
stay. HHA payments tend to be the lowest among the providers, reflecting their less extensive services.
Although the Medicare program has different coverage criteria,
facility requirements, and payment methods for each post-acute
care setting (Figure 3), policymakers remain concerned about the
lack of clear distinctions in services and expertise across providers,
particularly given the significant differences in payment amounts.

FIGURE 3
Medicare Post-Acute Care Coverage Requirements: Patients, Facilities, and Services
PROVIDER TYPE

Patient Requirements

Facility Requirements

Services

Home Health
Agency (HHA)

Home-bound, need skilled
nursing care on a part-time or
intermittent basis

N/A

Skilled nursing care;
physical, occupational, and
speech therapy; medical social
work; home health aide

Skilled Nursing
Facility (SNF)

Need short-term skilled
nursing or rehabilitation
services on an inpatient basis
after a hospital stay of at least
three days

N/A

Skilled nursing care,
rehabilitation services

Inpatient
Rehabilitation
Facility (IRF)

Must need intensive
rehabilitation therapy and be
able to tolerate and benefit
from three hours or more of
therapy a day

At least 60 percent of the
facility’s patients have one
of several specific medical
conditions that require
inpatient therapy

Intensive inpatient physical,
occupational, or speech
rehabilitation services

Long-Term
Care Hospital
(LTCH)

Clinically complex problems

Average Medicare length of
stay greater than 25 days

Acute care inpatient hospital
services

Source: MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, chapter 3, March 2010,
available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar10_EntireReport.pdf.
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According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) “PAC [post-acute care] settings lack clear boundaries around
the services furnished and the types of patients treated…. Yet, the
setting where a patient is treated has very different cost implications
for the program (and for the beneficiary, through the copayments).”6
U s e of Po s t- Acu te C a re

Post-acute care use varies widely across individuals with similar
conditions and can follow numerous patterns. The choice of postacute setting may be based on ownership or contracting relationships of the discharging hospital. Further, LTCHs and IRFs are not
located in all geographic areas, so they are not options for a large
number of patients. Decisions may also hinge on the patient’s living situation. A patient who does not have support in the home, for
example, may not be able to be discharged from the hospital with
home health care.
For some patients, care may proceed from a more intensive to a less
intensive site, for example from an IRF to home health care, as treatment progresses. Other patients may be discharged from a hospital
to a SNF for recuperative care
and then proceed to an IRF for
Readmission Policy Changes
more rehabilitation. Many postacute care episodes are punctuThe bundling pilot outlined in PPACA is one of several approaches to
slowing spending growth that are being implemented or tested in the
ated by a return to the acute care
Medicare program. Another option focuses on reducing avoidable hospital
hospital, which may be one of
readmissions of Medicare patients. Beginning in 2012,* Medicare will identhe most expensive components
tify hospitals that have “excess” readmissions for specified conditions or
of an episode.
Based on an examination of postacute care use conducted for the
Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation (ASPE), in 2006,
over 14 percent of Medicare feefor-service (FFS) beneficiaries
had an index hospitalization,
which was defined as one following 60 days without an inpatient
stay or post-acute care services.7
Of these beneficiaries, just over
35 percent were discharged to

procedures and then penalize them by reducing their Medicare payments.
By targeting the hospital payment, the hospital is held responsible for what
happens after the patient is discharged. Like a bundled payment approach,
this new readmission policy is intended to provide incentives for considering care consequences beyond each institution’s walls. In response to this
policy change, hospitals are expected to improve discharge planning or
other activities, like coordinating care with physicians and post-acute care
providers, which will minimize readmissions.‡
* Fiscal years beginning on or after October 1, 2012.
‡ Deborah Peikes et al., “Effects of Care Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care,
and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare Beneficiaries: 15 Randomized Trials,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 301, no. 6 (2009): pp. 603–618, available at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/6/603.full.
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post-acute care for further treatment. Most beneficiaries received
their post-acute care in SNFs (41.4 percent) or through home health
(37.4 percent); the rest were treated in an IRF (10.3 percent) or with
hospital outpatient therapy (9.1 percent), and a small share received
care in a LTCH (2 percent). The proportions of patients who used
post-acute care varied based on the cause of the index hospitalization. The majority (87.3 percent) of patients hospitalized for a major
joint procedure,8 for example, used post-acute services, with considerable variation in the site of care (Figure 4). Moreover, Medicare’s
payments for the care of these patients differed as well. Of the patients hospitalized for stroke,9 58.1 percent received post-acute care,
with about one-third admitted to an IRF, another third to a SNF, and
about 20 percent to home health.
Generally, the higher the severity and cost of the index hospitalization, the more expensive the post-acute service use. The mean total
payment (the initial admission plus post-acute use until there was a
60-day period without service use) was $23,985 for post-acute users
following a major joint procedure (DRG 544).10 Payments for beneficiaries who had no comorbid or complicating conditions (one measure

FIGURE 4: Selected Patterns of Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
Patients Hospitalized with Pneumonia, 2006 (DRG 089, Simple Pneumonia and Pleurisy Age > 17 with complication or comorbity)
Discharged to:

Percent of
Patients

Home, No
Post-Acute Care

Home Health
Only

Home Health then
Rehospitalized

SNF
Only

SNF then
Home Health

66.4%

7.8%

4.1%

8.8%

2.9%

Patients Hospitalized with Joint Replacement, 2006 (DRG 544, Major Joint Replacement or Reattachment of Lower Extremity)
Discharged to:

Percent of
Patients

Home, No
Post-Acute Care

Home Health
Only

IRF then
Home Health

SNF
Only

SNF then
Home Health

12.7%

20.1%

8.9%

7.5%

17.1%

Note: Not all patterns of care following a hospitalization are shown.
Source: Author's calculations using data from Barbara Gage et al., “Examining Post Acute Care Relationships in an Integrated Hospital System:
Final Report,” Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Department of Health and Human Services, RTI International,
Project Number 0208820.002.001, February 2009, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/09/pacihs/index.shtml.
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of severity) averaged $17,724, compared with $35,319 for those with
five or more conditions. For beneficiaries with an index hospitalization for pneumonia (DRG 089), one-third used post-acute care and
the average episode payment was $20,476, but ranged from $16,096 to
$23,241, depending on level of severity.
Few conclusions can be drawn from the literature about the most
effective site or pattern of care, or factors that affect the type and
amount of service use.11 Research has been limited by the lack of consistent patient assessment measures across settings, including outcome measures upon discharge. According to MedPAC, “Ideally, a
common assessment tool would gather uniform information to help
providers make appropriate placement decisions and enable CMS
[the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services] to evaluate patient
outcomes within and across settings.”12 CMS was directed by law
to develop such a tool for use in all post-acute care sites. The Continuity Assessment Record and Evaluation (CARE) instrument was
developed to measure clinical and functional status of patients upon
hospital discharge and post-acute care admission and discharge.13 So
far, the CARE instrument has been tested by almost 200 providers;
an evaluation of the data collected is scheduled for release in 2011.

RES P O N SES TO BU N DL I N G
Patients who require post-acute care services after a hospitalization
are often beneficiaries with complex needs who receive expensive
care. Therefore there may be multiple opportunities to better coordinate these services to improve the efficiency of the care over the
episode. With the financial flexibility of a bundled payment, the
responsible entity will be able to tailor treatment options to fit the
specific needs of the patients and to improve transitions among settings. Ostensibly, the bundled payment will encourage physicians
and other providers to consider the entire period for which the beneficiary will need care, which may suggest ways to shorten stays in
expensive institutions, like LTCHs or IRFs, and promote other tradeoffs. The lack of clearly preferable treatment options may represent
the ultimate opportunity for innovation in treatment design.
A bundled payment, however, could also reward some undesirable
behaviors, such as stinting on care, delaying certain services and
treatments so that they would be provided outside of the episode,
or avoiding high-cost patients. The entity that receives the payment
9
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would have incentives to reduce services or limit transfers to expensive providers. In this case, the costs of the care covered under the
bundled payment would indeed be lowered, but the efficiency of
care would not necessarily be improved. Whether these behaviors
would have a negative effect on care would be hard to detect because
standards of post-acute care and outcomes are poorly measured. To
the extent that such responses would just push services outside of
the bundle, either by provider or time, they may actually hurt the
quality of care and increase, rather than decrease, overall costs.

U N I QUE C H A L L EN G ES O F BU N DL I N G
P OS T- ACU T E C A RE
The lack of clear clinical indications for post-acute care site or services, the characteristics of the overall health care market, and the
complexity of the patient population are challenges that need to be
addressed in a bundled payment approach. The addition of postacute care services to a hospitalization for a bundled payment will
complicate efforts to ensure that appropriate services are provided to
patients, particularly when strong financial incentives reward minimizing service use.
A p p ro p ria te Si te

There are no widely accepted standards for choice of post-acute care,
and there is little systematic evidence to indicate which site of postacute care or which services are clinically indicated for a patient.14
Often, the choice of setting is based on availability, proximity, and
patient preferences. Although these factors need to be considered,
the dearth of clinical and rehabilitation outcome information may
result in suboptimal decisions by patients and providers. This information gap can leave the Medicare program vulnerable to paying
too much and the beneficiary vulnerable to inappropriate or inadequate care. Because the cost of care across sites varies considerably
and the services provided in each setting are the same or similar,
when the situation is ambiguous, the entity receiving the bundled
payment will favor the site with the lowest net expense.
Ownership or other organizational connections between providers could strongly influence the choice of post-acute care setting or
particular provider. Many hospitals own post-acute care providers
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and that number could grow under the incentives of bundling. In
2006, close to 13 percent of patients who were discharged to a SNF
went to a hospital-based provider, about half of hospital discharges
to an IRF were to a hospital-based provider, and almost 21 percent
of patients discharged to home health received their care from a
hospital-based HHA.15 If the payment entity, for example, was a hospital that had a SNF unit, it would strongly prefer to send patients
needing post-acute care to that SNF. In this way, it would keep more
of the payment, have better control of costs and occupancy in both
settings, minimize disruptions for the patient, and have more opportunities to ensure continuity of care. Although these incentives exist
under the current payment methods, they would be strengthened
under a bundled approach. Whether this is
always consistent with providing quality
The lack of widely
care is not known.

accepted standards for post-acute
care site and service needs will complicate efforts to
ensure appropriate care during an episode.

Another factor that affects choice and use
of post-acute care is that some settings are
not widely available. The two most expensive, IRFs and LTCHs, are not located in all states or some larger
regions. In 2007, IRF beds per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries ranged
from 1.82 in Arkansas and 2.09 in Louisiana, to 0.19 in Maryland and
0.30 in Oregon.16 The disparities in the availability of LTCH beds is
even greater, ranging from 3.08 beds per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in Louisiana and 3.92 in Massachusetts to none in Alaska, Iowa,
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont. This wide
disparity in availability of providers raises questions about the use
of post-acute care for beneficiaries in areas without access to IRFs or
LTCHs. It may complicate efforts to develop an appropriate bundled
payment amount and evaluate the impact of bundling on spending.
Fre e d o m of C h oi ce

Whether by ownership or through contractual arrangements, entities accepting bundled payments will have to develop affiliations
across providers to deliver all required services, manage the episode of care, and determine the distribution of the payment. These
arrangements, in effect, will limit patients’ freedom of choice of
providers, which has been a basic tenet of Medicare fee-for-service.
Under Medicare’s managed care option (Medicare Advantage) freedom of choice is restricted, but beneficiaries voluntarily enroll in
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that program. How beneficiary preference or choice of provider
would be considered under a bundled payment option is not clear,
nor is it clear whether or how a patient could choose to participate
in the pilot.
Just as Medicare beneficiaries have freedom to choose their providers, providers that do not have a contractual arrangement with the
entity that receives the bundled payment may argue that they should
be able to participate in the bundling pilot. They may say that the
entity should take “any willing provider” that accepts the terms and
conditions offered. Providers may be especially concerned about exclusive relationships developed to accept a bundled payment if they
are excluded and their market share is threatened. This might particularly be the case for smaller or independent providers that are
in markets where a dominant system that can provide the range of
acute and post-acute services required for the episode receives the
bundled payment.

OU TCO M ES O F C A RE
The ability to assess the value of the services is particularly important under a bundled arrangement to protect the welfare of the patient. Patients who use post-acute care often have multiple medical
needs, use multiple providers, and have multiple episodes of care
during the year.17 Measures that have been used to assess the effectiveness of post-acute care include return to the community; activities of daily living; instrumental activities of daily living; function
related to walking, self-reported health, and satisfaction; rehospitalizations; and mortality.18 Some of these measures are objective and
could be adjusted to account for different propensities across patient
types. Others, however, are at least somewhat subjective and reflect
social supports as well as the adequacy of rehabilitation or recovery.
Further, for some elderly patients with chronic conditions, functional improvements may not be realistic, and maintenance of condition
may not be readily achieved either.
In addition, the line between when post-acute care ends and longterm support services begin is not clear in many cases. Long-term
support services are oriented to social supports and maintenance
rather than rehabilitation and recovery. The ability to shift the line
between post-acute care and long-term support services was apparent when Medicare home health coverage rules were relaxed
12

ISSUE BRIEF

www.nhpf.org

NO. 841

in 1988 and utilization skyrocketed, which was an indication that
Medicare’s home health benefit had changed so that it was being
used to provide long-term supports to beneficiaries.19 The distinction
between post-acute and long-term support services is particularly
important because the Medicare program does not pay for long-term
support services, so the entity receiving the bundled payment will
have strong incentives to define service needs as long-term support
services to minimize its financial responsibility.20

DESI G N FE AT U RES TO A D D RESS
CO N CERN S O F BU N DL I N G
The design of the bundled payment approach will affect whether
providers respond with changes that improve the continuity and efficiency of care.21 The approach needs to incorporate enough flexibility to allow providers to be creative in adopting new delivery models

Critical Features of a Bundled Payment
Designation of the entity — The entity that receives the bundled payment is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate

care is delivered, that providers are paid, and that the care is coordinated. This entity should have the relevant clinical
expertise, relationships with the necessary providers, and experience managing episodes of care.
Definition of the bundle — The bundle of services and providers covered by the payment would need to be carefully

delineated to help prevent shifting services and costs out of the bundle. The entity has incentives to lower the costs
of treating the patient by moving services out of the time frame of the episode or to determine that services are not
needed. While reducing costs to the entity, this could actually increase program costs and may further fragment care.
Determination of the payment amount and adjustments — The amount of the bundled payment would need to be high enough

to cover the costs of delivering necessary services efficiently, but also lean enough to exert some pressure on the entity
to manage the episode. Appropriate adjustments to the payment would be needed to ensure that patients with greater
needs continue to have access and to help ensure that any savings are not due to stinting on care or “cherry picking”
less expensive patients.
Measurement of quality and outcomes — The quality and outcomes of care would need to be carefully assessed because the

entity has incentives to minimize costs, which could be achieved by stinting on necessary care or by substituting less
expensive treatments that may not be as effective. New measures would need to be developed and tested to ensure
that quality and outcomes were not diminished. Current measures often merely count the number and type of services
received by the patient and would not be adequate because the bundled payment is intended to change the delivery of
care. Particularly challenging will be measures that accurately assess the care to patients who are unlikely to improve.
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and to reward improvements in care coordination and efficiency. At
the same time, it needs to protect patients from inadequate or inappropriate care and protect the Medicare program and beneficiaries
from paying for services that are not beneficial or not delivered. The
criteria for designating the payment entity and the bundle definition, payment amount and adjustments, and outcomes and quality
measures will determine whether the bundling pilot can promote
more coordinated, efficient patterns of care.
Pay m e n t En ti t y

At a minimum, the entity that receives the bundled payment would
need to be large enough to manage the risk that the payment may
not cover the costs of care for some patients, to be able to arrange
for all of the services required by every patient, and to apportion
the payment across providers. Other requirements likely include
the ability to manage care, report patient-level data, and ensure the
quality of care across the entire episode. In many instances, the entity is likely to be a hospital or provider system, which may own
post-acute care facilities or have other established contractual relationships with them. Acute care hospitals would be likelier than a
post-acute care provider or physician practice to have the resources
and infrastructure to manage this kind of endeavor. An integrated
delivery system may also have advantages in accepting a bundled
payment. Stricter requirements for entities with respect to these factors may provide better assurances of program success, but would
also restrict the number and type of bundling options that could be
evaluated.
Recognizing the difficulty of assigning an entity the responsibility
of coordinating and monitoring the range of services across multiple
providers and the potential of unintended consequences, MedPAC
recommended that Medicare pursue bundling in an incremental
manner.22 It recommended beginning with reduced payments to
hospitals with high avoidable readmissions, which Medicare is currently implementing. This essentially makes the hospital accountable for the quality of the transition out of the hospital, extending its
responsibility through payment incentives beyond the hospital stay.
This will allow the Medicare program to assess the use of payment
incentives to encourage a more collaborative approach to care transitions, and to evaluate how hospitals respond to these incentives.

14
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Bu n dl e D e f ini tio n

Critical aspects of the bundle definition have been specified in the
law, but many decisions remain that will affect the payment incentives. Although almost all Medicare-covered services are included
in the definition of the bundle, some services could be covered under the bundled payment and others paid separately, depending on
the need for the particular service. There could be distinctions, for
example, between services for the condition that caused the hospitalization and other services that may be required by the beneficiary
during the episode period. The entity could be responsible for all
services necessary to treat the designated condition; other necessary
services would be paid for separately. A further distinction could be
made between services for chronic conditions, such as arthritis or
diabetes, and acute conditions like a urinary tract infection or an injury from a fall. Among the acute conditions, some could reasonably
be expected to be avoided with appropriate medical care, and others
may be unavoidable.
Distinguishing between related and unrelated services may not
be straightforward. When a hospitalization is for a planned event,
such as a knee replacement, for example, it may be easier to make
this distinction than for an unplanned admission, like for treatment
of a stroke. Similarly, services associated with an acute event, such
as a fall or accident, may be easier to distinguish from services associated with the episode than services related to chronic conditions such as arthritis or diabetes. With any definition, however, the
entity that receives the payment has strong incentives to exclude
services from the bundle and the payer, in this case Medicare, has
incentives to be inclusive with services. The distinctions between
the services and treatments related to the acute/post-acute episode
and other conditions may have a large effect on the costs under the
episode payment and the assignment of the responsibility for managing health care conditions.
The more inclusive the bundle definition, the more opportunities
there would be to substitute across services to improve care and to
tailor treatment to meet specific clinical or personal needs. If the
entity was responsible for treating a patient’s chronic conditions
as well as the condition requiring the hospitalization, it might be
more likely to coordinate all of the patient’s medications or integrate
therapies that would be beneficial for coincident conditions, for example. With the greater opportunities come greater risks, however.
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The entity would be at greater financial risk for unexpected or high
costs associated with the need for particular services. And the patient would be at greater risk of inadequate or substandard care if an
entity tried to avoid providing particular services.
One option for defining the bundle for a single payment is a “building block” approach, in which episode definitions expand as more
information becomes available.23 Initially, for example, the bundle
may be the hospital care and the physician services provided during the hospital stay. Medicare is currently testing this narrower
definition of an episode. With more information, the bundle could
be expanded to include one or more post-acute care services, particularly for conditions that have a more limited and established
pattern of care.
Pay m e n t A m o u n t s

The payment amount for the bundle of services needs to be set appropriately to reward entities that deliver an episode of care efficiently and provide incentives for improvement. If the payment is
too low, participation may be limited and any entity that does participate will have stronger incentives to stint on services or avoid
potentially high-cost patients. If the payment is too high, Medicare
and the beneficiaries will be paying too much and the entity will
not need to implement the desired efficiencies. The bundle definition
and other features of the pilot will affect the appropriate level of the
payment amount.
Medicare typically has used national average provider costs as a
proxy for the costs of an efficient provider when it sets prospective
payment rates. Given the wide variation in costs of care for patients
with a similar diagnosis, this proxy, even when adjusted for patient
characteristics and geographic cost differences, will significantly
overpay for many episodes and severely underpay for the most expensive ones. The average Medicare payment for an episode of care
for beneficiaries hospitalized with pneumonia who received postacute care, for example, was just over $20,000 in 2006. A payment
based on this average, however, would be too high for the two-thirds
of those patients who did not receive post-acute care. For the most
severely ill pneumonia patients, it could be 20 to 30 percent too low.24
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Risk-adjustment of payments to account for patient characteristics,
such as complications or comorbidities, that reflect their severity
and may predict their resource use is the primary method to help
ensure payment amounts are appropriate. In the absence of welldeveloped risk-adjustment methods, other ways to guard against
payments that are too high or too low include adjustments that limit
the entity’s profits or losses for an individual episode or all episodes,
such as risk corridors or risk sharing. Outlier payments could protect entities from unexpectedly high costs of certain individuals.
These methods could mitigate the potential negative consequences
of a bundled approach until more refined payment adjustments and
oversight mechanisms are fully developed.
Risk and Other Adjustments—Medicare uses different patient classifica-

tion methods with different underlying data requirements in hospitals and each post-acute care provider type to risk-adjust payments
(Figure 5). Typically, patients are grouped on the basis of characteristics that are associated with the services they need or their expected
resource use, and the payment for all patients in the same group are
adjusted by the same amount. Medicare’s hospital payment system

FIGURE 5
Post-Acute Care Providers: Medicare Payment and Classification Systems
PROVIDER TYPE

Payment Method

Home Health
Agency (HHA)

Per 60-day episode

HHRGs—home health resource groups, 153 categories based
on clinical and functional status and service use

Per diem

RUGs—resource utilization groups, 66 categories based on
presence of certain diagnoses, therapy, and service use

Inpatient
Rehabilitation
Facility (IRF)

Per discharge

CMGs—case-mix groups, 100 intensive rehabilitation
categories based on primary reason for need for rehabilitation,
functional and cognitive impairments and comorbidities

Long-Term
Care Hospital
(LTCH)

Per discharge

MS LTC-DRGs—Medicare severity–long-term care–diagnosis
related groups based on principle reason for admission,
complications and comorbidities and severity

Skilled Nursing
Facility (SNF)

Patient Classification

Source: Federal Register, vol. 75, no. 221, November 17, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-27778.pdf; Federal Register,
vol. 74, no. 153, August 11, 2009, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-18662.pdf; Federal Register, vol. 74, no. 86, May 6, 2009,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-10078.htm; Federal Register, vol. 75, no. 157, August 16, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/
pdf/2010-19092.pdf.
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uses the Medicare severity-diagnosis related group (MS-DRG) system to group patients based on diagnosis, age, and complicating
conditions.
The MS-DRG system will likely be used to identify the conditions
that will be included in the pilot and to risk-adjust the bundled
payment. The ASPE studies and analyses by MedPAC indicate that
higher severity patients (as indicated by higher severity MS-DRGs
during the inpatient stay) are likelier to use post-acute care and have
higher average post-acute care spending.25 Whether these distinctions are robust enough to use in adjusting a bundled payment is
not clear. There is little reason to believe, however, that any of the
existing risk adjustment methods used in post-acute care settings
would improve the adjustment for an episode payment.26 In fact, the
risk adjustment systems for SNFs and HHAs in particular have been
criticized because they incorporate service use as a measure of severity. This means that the payment is increased for patients who
receive more therapy services, which provides incentives for these
providers to deliver more services. The SNF and home health risk
adjusters have driven up the provision of therapy services and the
resulting payments, even though there is no evidence that the patients need or are benefiting from the extra therapy.27
CMS is testing the CARE instrument in various post-acute settings
to determine if it is adequate for collecting consistent patient assessment information across post-acute settings. It includes information on medical, functional, cognitive impairments, and social/
environmental factors that either measure severity differences within medical conditions or predict outcomes. Consistent data across
all of the settings could go a long way toward the development of
adequate risk adjustment methods. Although these are the types of
factors that might be needed to supplement the MS-DRGs, understanding the relationship between these factors, episode costs, and
episode outcomes will require considerable analysis and lead time.
In addition to helping to ensure that payments are appropriate, categorizing patients according to their expected costs is critical for accurately comparing the performance of the entities that receive the
bundled payment.28 Without this type of risk adjustment, one entity
may appear to have lower costs and better outcomes merely because
of the mix of patients it treated. Performance comparisons are important for the entities as they set up their network of providers,
to payers who want to assess whether they are receiving value for
18
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their payments, and for patients and providers as they make treatment choices. The factors used in risk adjustment for payment and
for measuring performance are likely to differ and be based on different data.29
Other Payment Adjustments— Other adjustments may be incorporated

into the bundled payment system. Medicare makes geographic adjustments in all of its payment systems to account for area differences in wages. Medicare also adjusts payments in some situations
to account for extra costs associated with operating in a rural area,
for example, or an inner city area, when it wants to ensure appropriate patient access. Analyses would be needed to determine if, for example, there are systematic differences in costs between post-acute
care episodes provided in rural versus urban areas, or the contribution of wage differences to episode costs. Medicare may also need to
consider the maldistribution of certain post-acute care providers in
making geographic adjustments to episode payments.
Q u ali t y A s s e s s m e n t a n d O ve r s ig h t

Medicare collects a significant number of provider-specific performance measures at each site of care. Many of these measures, however, are of discrete services rather than the full spectrum of services across an episode, and they provide little opportunity to assess
joint accountability for care delivered during an episode.30 Much
like the separate classification and risk adjustment systems across
providers, how and whether the performance measures can be combined to adequately assess an episode is not known.31 One analysis
of episode payment options concluded, “The separate performance
measurement and payment systems for each provider type and setting are not aligned around or reflective of the continuum of care
that a beneficiary receives within a given course of treatment or episode of care.”32
Incorporating ongoing oversight mechanisms into the design of a
bundled payment approach will also be critical. The vulnerability
of patients to underservice or poor care increases with the size and
extent of an inclusive payment approach. The larger the bundle, the
greater the ability of providers to make large sums of money by stinting on care, particularly if the patient classification system does not
adequately distinguish among patients based on their level of need.
Without a policy design that ensures that care for certain types of
19
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patients is not more profitable than care for other types of patients,
the less profitable patients may not have adequate access. Protecting from these potential problems requires continued, and possibly
expanded, reporting and evaluation of service-level data across the
entire episode. The total number of minutes of therapy, for example,
or patient functional status may need to be collected consistently
across sites to monitor the level of care patients are receiving and
to correlate care with outcomes. Lack of adequate planning for data
requirements and oversight would hamper efforts to refine and improve the bundled payment approach, while leaving beneficiaries
vulnerable to high costs and inadequate care.

CO N C LU S I O N
Medicare has implemented bundled payment methods for hospital
admissions, physician surgical services, dialysis treatments, and
other services, but the bundling option contemplated under PPACA
is the first to extend beyond individual sites and providers. Many believe that if providers have the financial incentives to coordinate and
manage care as they would under a bundled payment, they would
focus on improving the efficiency of care through better coordination of services over time and across settings. They would need to
improve information exchange, which in turn could improve quality
of care. Rather than delineating the ways to achieve this, a bundled
payment turns over the responsibility for developing these improvements to an entity in exchange for financial rewards in meeting
these objectives. But the payment method may also reward inadequate care or patient selection without certain safeguards. The entity
that receives the payment needs to have the clinical expertise and
range of provider capability to be able to ensure that patients receive
appropriate care. The bundle of services needs to be adequately defined to ensure that patient care standards are met, that services are
not delayed so they are covered under another payment, and to facilitate monitoring. The payment and adjustments need to be appropriate to reward entities for coordinating and managing the care of
patients, ensure patient access, and achieve efficiencies for the payer.
The performance of the providers should be adequately assessed
and monitored in a timely manner so that any problems can be addressed quickly. Although options for constraining the financial risk
to entities for accepting a bundled payment also limit their ability to
experiment with alternative models of care, given the potential for
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unintended consequences of the bundled payments, such risk mitigation may be needed for Medicare to maintain its responsibility to
its beneficiaries and program spending.
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